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Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Declines in Croatia 
Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence that Croatian companies manage reported earnings to 
avoid losses and earnings declines. Specifically, we find that the cross-sectional distribution of 
scaled earnings and changes in earnings show high frequencies of small positive earnings and small 
increases in earnings while the frequencies of small losses and small decreases in earnings are less 
frequent. Furthermore, we demonstrate that these discontinuities are likely due to discretionary 
accruals. We examine the frequency distribution of reported earnings after removing discretionary 
accruals and find that the cross sectional distributions of non-discretionary scaled earnings shows 
lower frequencies of small positive earnings and higher frequencies of small negative earnings. 
Additionally, the cross sectional distribution of non-discretionary change in earnings demonstrates 
mixed frequencies of non-discretionary changes in earnings. Overall, this paper adds new empirical 
evidence to the benchmark-beating literature by demonstrating international evidence of earnings 
management around zero earnings and zero earnings changes benchmarks. 
K e y w o r d s :  Earnings management; Earnings Declines; Earnings Losses; Discretionary Accruals; 
Earnings frequency distribution 
J E L  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s :  C18, F30, G14, G15, G39, M41. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in earnings management around 
benchmarks (Habib and Hansen, 2008). Previous studies have reported discontinuities at zero in the 
empirical distributions of earnings in relation to basic benchmarks in both the US and Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; Beatty, Ke, and Petroni, 
2002; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Gore, Pope and Singh, 2007; Donelson, Mcinnis, and 
Mergenthaler, 2013; Burgstahler and Chuk, 2015). However, little attention has been paid to 
Continental Europe and, in particular, Croatia (Aljinović Barać and Klepo, 2006). Therefore, this 
study provides an important opportunity to advance the understanding of whether the occurrence of 
discontinuities within earnings distribution exists beyond the US and the UK. Despite scarce 
evidence for Europe, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) reveal that code-law countries; countries 
with less developed stock markets, more concentrated ownership and lower disclosure level, all 
have relatively more prevalent earnings management compared to common-law countries. For 
instance, Austria, with the same legal origins as Croatia, has the highest level of earnings 
management in an international comparison of 31 countries (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). On 
the contrary, common-law countries with a developed stock market, such as the US, have the lowest 
level of earnings management (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).  
Moreover, Aljinović Barać and Klepo (2006) conduct a survey among Croatian auditors and 
reveal that accounting manipulations in Croatia are fairly significant, primarily with the aim of 
hiding bad performance, then secondarily to minimise fiscal and political costs and to obtain better 
terms for banks’ crediting, avoiding debt covenants and maximising managers’ compensation. The 
present study expands Aljinović Barać and Klepo’s (2006) study by providing the first empirical 
findings in Croatia that demonstrates the prevalence of earnings management following Burgstahler 
and Dichev’s (1997) methodology. 
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With regards to the accounting standards, since 2005 all consolidated financial statements of 
publicly traded companies must be prepared in accordance with IFRS; therefore financial 
statements are prepared under the accruals concept (IASPlus, 2013). For this reason, since managers 
have more flexibility in changing accruals rather than changing accounting policies, which is more 
costly, there is a high possibility of earnings manipulation using accruals (Healy, 1985; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). Therefore, we test whether there is evidence of earnings manipulation 
specifically using discretionary accruals in Croatia. 
The main research objective of this study is to test whether companies in Croatia manage 
reported earnings to maintain positive earnings as well as positive changes in earnings. The results 
are based on annual reported earnings of 186 publicly listed Croatian companies, which are 
collected from Bloomberg database, for the period 2006-2013. The methodology is based on 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) where the frequency distribution is examined with special attention 
to observations around zero earnings and zero changes in earnings. Moreover, as discussed above 
since it may be expected that Croatian companies use accruals for earnings manipulation, we 
examine whether the discontinuities around zero are the result of discretionary accruals. We use 
both the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) and the performance-adjusted 
model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005) to measure discretionary accruals. 
The findings of the study show evidence of high frequency of earnings management around 
zero earnings and zero earnings changes i.e. high frequency of small positive earnings and small 
positive earnings changes in relation to last year’s earnings. Overall this study contributes to the 
earnings management literature in two important areas. First, to the best of our knowledge, this 
paper for the first time empirically investigates and provides evidence on earnings management 
around earnings benchmarks in Croatia. Second, the findings reveal that the discontinuities in the 
distribution of earnings around zero (levels and changes) are related to discretionary accruals.  
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
literature followed by the development of the hypotheses. Section 4 provides the sample selection 
procedure and methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and key findings followed by 
a final section which concludes this study. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing interest in the research of earnings 
management. Earnings management incorporates managerial judgement in choosing accounting 
policies to either convey private information on future earnings and to obtain personal gains, to 
mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001; Sankar and Subramanyam, 
2001; Schipper, 1989). 
Prior research has investigated the factors that can create incentives to meet certain 
benchmarks, such as earnings and analyst earnings forecasts. For example, a considerable amount 
of ‘benchmark-beating’ literature discusses cash and equity based CEOs compensation as the 
motivation to beat earnings benchmarks given that compensation is based directly or indirectly on 
earnings figures (Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresset and Philippon, 2006; Habib and Hansen, 2008). Furthermore, debt covenants and 
political costs might also lead to incentives to beat earnings benchmarks given that these may be 
contingent on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Key, 1997; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Latridis and Kadorinis, 2009; Rodríguez - 
Pérez and Hemmen, 2010). Capital market incentives through analysts’ earnings forecasts have also 
been discussed given that analysts’ disclosures add value in the capital market (Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Dumontier and Raffournier, 2002).  
Therefore, due to the high interest in reported earnings, incentives for managing reported 
earnings in relation to earnings benchmarks are utterly compelling. Thus a considerable amount of 
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research on earnings management around benchmarks has been done (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; Chen et al., 2010) establishing the following three 
significant benchmarks: earnings levels (to avoid reporting losses), earnings changes (to avoid 
declines in earnings) and meeting the analysts’ forecasts.  
Two underlying theories support managers’ motives to manipulate accounting figures in order 
to avoid reporting losses or declines in earnings. First, the prospect theory indicates that investors 
are willing to invest relative to a particular reference point rather than to the final degree of wealth 
(Kahneman, and Tversky, 1979). Moreover, this theory confirms that a shift from losses to gains is 
highly valuable, since investors perceive this as a positive rather than a negative sign. As a result, it 
is clear that managers are highly motivated to avoid losses as well as negative changes in earnings. 
The second theory is transaction theory that is based on the two following assumptions 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). First, transaction terms between a company and its stakeholders are 
affected by earnings information. In addition, companies with higher earnings provide better 
transaction terms. Furthermore, as Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, p. 123) state “as warehousing, 
covering and data processing costs are too high, they are likely to induce some stakeholders to focus 
on simple heuristics as being either nil levels or nil variations of profits in the case of decision-
making”.  
Empirical research corroborates the aforementioned theory by providing evidence of earnings 
management, to avoid negative earnings and earnings decreases. For example, Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) analyse earnings before extraordinary items for the period 1976-1994 in the US 
setting. They demonstrate unusually high frequencies of small positive earnings and small increases 
in earnings, whereas small losses and small decreases in earnings have unusually low frequencies. 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) perform a similar analysis using US companies for the 
period 1974-1996. In their analysis they also include analyst earnings forecasts as an additional 
earnings threshold to meet. Their results are in line with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997); thus they 
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reveal persuasive evidence of earnings management to beat all three earnings benchmarks. Despite 
this evidence, they imply that scaling earnings could be the reason for the irregularities in 
distributions. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) examine 25,951 observations in the period from 1986-
2000, they also conclude that US companies’ earnings are managed to avoid negative earnings 
surprises in relation to analysts’ forecasts. Further studies in the US that corroborate the 
interpretation that discontinuities around zero earnings and/or changes in earnings are due to 
earnings management include Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002), Donelson, Mcinnis, and Mergenthaler 
(2013) and Burgsthahler and Chuk (2015). Together, these studies outline that managers in US 
companies use accounting discretion to beat the aforementioned earnings benchmarks. 
International studies have also been conducted to determine the importance of these earnings 
benchmarks. However, most of these studies are conducted in developed markets with similarities 
to the US market. For example, Holland and Ramsay’s (2003) analysis of Australian listed 
companies for the period 1990-2000  report frequencies of earnings consistent with Burgstahler and 
Dichev’s (1997) findings. Furthermore, they extend their research by dividing their sample into 
small and large firms and as a result, they reveal that the results of earnings management for larger 
Australian companies are more significant when compared to smaller companies. Gore, Pope and 
Singh (2007) demonstrate that UK companies engage in earnings manipulation to meet earnings 
thresholds as well. They also suggest that managing earnings through accruals is related to the 
discontinuities in earnings distribution. Subsequently, they show that non-discretionary earnings are 
not discontinuously distributed around benchmarks, whereas earnings distribution is discontinuous. 
Using an alternative methodology, Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) also provide evidence of 
accrual management to avoid earnings losses and earnings declines.  
Evidence from Asian countries is consistent with the results of the aforementioned studies. 
For example, Suda and Shuto (2005) find that Japanese companies manage accruals in order to shift 
losses and earnings decreases to positive post-managed earnings. Not surprisingly, in line with 
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Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki’s (2003) findings that common-law countries have less prevalent 
earnings management than code-law countries, Suda and Shuto’s (2005) results demonstrate that 
Japanese companies engage in earnings management more often than US companies. On the 
contrary, evidence from Singapore and Thailand refute earnings management to sustain recent 
performance although there is considerable evidence that Singaporean non-financial and Thai 
financial companies manage earnings to report positive or zero earnings (Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn, 2009). 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
Prior research indicates that earnings quality or the level of earnings management of firms is 
related to the regulatory, cultural and institutional environment in each country (Hung, 2001; Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Wright et al., 2006; Cabán-García, 2009; Han et al., 2010). Specifically, 
countries with weak investor protection or regulatory environment have a higher prevalence of 
earnings management (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Han et al., 2010). Therefore, earnings 
management is lower in countries with a higher level of enforcement of the rules, stricter securities 
regulation, lower ownership concentration and a higher degree of investor protection. Cabán-García 
(2009), using a sample of European firms, finds that each country’s security regulations has an 
impact on earnings quality, and this is only slightly alleviated by cross-listing in countries with 
stricter regulations. The level of tolerance to earnings management also differs in relation to the 
environment. For example, individuals from stakeholder-oriented institutional backgrounds are less 
accepting of earnings management than those from shareholder-oriented institutional backgrounds 
(Geiger and Smith, 2010).  
The Croatian market has a different institutional setting than Anglo-Saxon countries. Croatia 
is part of the Middle and Eastern European countries in transition; hence, it is a relatively young 
financial market and it has a bank-oriented rather than a market-oriented economy (Cingula, Ređep 
and Klačmer, 2003; Seba Grubišić, 2013). Moreover, since Croatian taxation and accounting rules 
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are aligned with macroeconomics objectives (Aljinović Barać and Klepo, 2006) it is evident that 
financial statements are not prepared with the intention of reducing information asymmetry as is the 
case in the US. In addition, there can be no doubt that tax authorities, creditors and investors are the 
most important targets for earnings manipulation (Aljinović Barać and Klepo, 2006). Prior research 
indicates that earnings management in countries in which companies are financed mostly by debt 
(e.g. France) are directly linked to contractual debt costs and the effective tax rate (Othman and 
Zeghal, 2006) as opposed to Anglo-American firms that rely more on the capital markets. Hence, it 
can be argued that Croatian managers have incentives to hide reported losses due to an increase in 
transaction costs, if they report these losses (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Additionally, 
according to Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), European companies evidently show a greater 
magnitude of earnings management due to loss avoidance. The survey results of Aljinović Barać 
and Klepo (2006) confirm Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki’s (2003) findings and conclude that hiding 
bad performance is one of the main reasons for earnings manipulation in Croatia. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis is the following:   
H1: Earnings are managed to avoid losses 
Due to the institutional setting of the Croatian market, it is very likely that companies engage 
in earnings management to avoid debt covenant violation (Dichev and Skinner, 2002). In other 
words, if companies’ performance begins to decrease, the possibility of engaging in earnings 
manipulation is higher (Dichev and Skinner, 2002), most likely to avoid violating their debt 
covenants. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that Croatian companies manage reported 
earnings to sustain previous year’s earnings. For this reason, the following hypothesis is addressed:  
H2: Earnings are managed to avoid declines in relation to prior year’s earnings 
Additionally, all consolidated financial statements of Croatian publicly listed companies from 
2005 are prepared under the accruals concept of IFRSs (IASPlus, 2013). Prior research indicates 
that discretionary accruals are used as a common method for earnings manipulations (Jones, 1991; 
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DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) and are less costly than changing accounting policies (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Healy, 1985). In addition, discretionary accruals are incorporated within the 
reported earnings, and cause discontinuities in earnings distribution, hence it is expected that their 
removal will minimise discontinuities (Jones, 1991; Gore, Pope and Singh, 2007). Therefore we test 
the following hypotheses: 
H3: Non-discretionary earnings do not exhibit a discontinuity around zero 
H4:  Non-discretionary changes in earnings do not exhibit a discontinuity around zero 
We do not hypothesise or test earnings management in relation to the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts benchmarks, given that Croatia’s market is less developed and analyst information is not 
regarded as significant as the other earnings benchmarks (Aljinović Barać and Klepo, 2006). 
4. Sample Selection and Methodology 
4.1 Sample Selection  
For the purpose of this analysis, available data of annual reported earnings of Croatian listed 
companies in 2013 for the period 2005-2013 is collected from the Bloomberg database. The initial 
sample comprised of 264 publicly listed companies on Zagreb Stock Exchange. The sample is 
reduced by eliminating all the companies within the financial industry. Moreover, we require 
companies to have announced financial statements at least three years in a row for the purpose of 
discretionary accrual measurement. The final sample consists of 186 companies over the period 
2006-2013.
1
  
4.2 Methodology 
 
This study tests whether companies in Croatia manage reported earnings to maintain positive 
earnings and/or positive changes in earnings. We use the frequency distribution methodology as set 
out in the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) study. Specifically, we examine the frequency distribution 
of Et (Earnings in year t) and Et (Change in earnings between year t and the previous year t-1). Et 
                                                 
1
 Data in year 2005 is used to estimate discretionary accruals and therefore is not part of the sample period. 
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variables are scaled by opening total assets in year t and Et variables are scaled by opening total 
assets in year t-1. The opening total assets is chosen as  the scaling factor rather than market value 
of equity given that the stock market in Croatia is less developed than in the US and UK. 
Histograms of the pooled cross-sectional empirical distribution of the scaled level of earnings and 
the scaled earnings changes are provided for all available firms in the sample in the years 2006-
2013 for the earnings variable and 2007-2013 for the earnings change variable.
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 As a result, the 
documented distributions reveal if earnings levels and changes are distributed with discontinuities 
around zero. 
Moreover, the review of the literature has already revealed that the use of discretionary 
accruals is related to earnings management to beat earnings benchmarks and it is expected that their 
removal will minimise discontinuities (Gore, Pope and Singh, 2007). We calculate discretionary 
accruals using both the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) and the 
performance-adjusted model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005).  
We calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995). First, we estimate the following regression: 
TAit = α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 (REVit) + α3 (PPEit) + it. (1) 
The regression is run on an annual basis, where, 
TAit = total accruals for firm i in year t defined as current assets less cash minus current liabilities 
less short-term debt, excluding depreciation ; 
 Ait-1 = total assets for firm i in t-1; 
REVit = revenues for firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 scaled by total assets at t-1; 
RECit = net receivables for firm i in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scaled by total assets at 
t-1; 
PPEit = gross property plant and equipment for firm i in year t scaled by total assets at t-1; 
                                                 
2
 Outliers are eliminated in the distributional histograms. 
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it, = normally distributed error term.  
Using the firm specific coefficients from the above regression, ̂1, ̂2, ̂3, we then estimate 
the non-discretionary accruals as:  
MJ_NDAit = ̂1 (1/Ait-1) + ̂2 (REVit - RECit) + ̂3 (PPEit), (2) 
where, MJ_NDAit = non-discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, using the modified Jones 
methodology. All other variables are as previously defined. 
We also employ the performance-adjusted model (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005) to 
calculate discretionary accruals. First, we estimate the following regression: 
TAit = α0 + α1 (1/Ait-1) + α2 (REVit) + α3 (PPEit) + α4 ROAit + it, (3) 
where ROAit = return on assets for firm i in year t, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
All other variables are as previously defined. The regression is run on an annual basis in line with 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
Using the firm specific coefficients from the above regression, ̂0, ̂1, ̂2, ̂3, ̂4 , we then 
estimate the non-discretionary accruals as: 
PA_NDAit = ̂0 + ̂1 (1/Ait -1) + ̂2 REVit + ̂3 PPEit + ̂4 ROAit + υit, (4) 
where, PA_NDAit = non-discretionary accruals of firm i in year t, using the performance-adjusted 
methodology and all other variables are as previously defined. 
Discretionary accruals are then measured as follows: 
MJ_DAit  =  TAit – MJ_NDAit, (5) 
PA_DAit  =  TAit – PA_NDAit, (6) 
where, 
MJ_DAit = discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, using the modified Jones model;  
PA_DAit = discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, using the performance-adjusted model; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
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We then calculate earnings and change in earnings before discretionary accruals by 
subtracting discretionary accruals from earnings in each year t. Therefore, we provide frequency 
distributions for the following six variables:
3
 
Et = Earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t;   
MJ_NDEt = Non-discretionary earnings, scaled by opening total assets in year t, measured as 
earnings in year t less discretionary accruals in year t, estimated with the modified Jones model in 
year t; 
PA_NDEt = Non-discretionary earnings, scaled by opening total assets in year t, measured as 
earnings in year t less discretionary accruals in year t, estimated with the performance-adjusted 
model in year t; 
Et = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1; 
MJ_NDEt = Non-discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1 
measured as change in earnings less discretionary accruals, estimated with the modified Jones 
model in year t-1; 
PA_NDEt = Non-discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1 
measured as change in earnings less discretionary accruals, estimated with the performance-
adjusted model in year t-1. 
The statistical significance of the hypotheses is tested by using a method similar to that used 
in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Specifically, under the null hypothesis of no deviations from a 
normal distribution, the cross sectional distribution of earnings changes and earnings levels is 
relatively smooth. We present the frequency distribution of the variables across intervals of Et or 
Et and test that the distribution is smooth using standardised differences. This standardised 
difference is the difference between the actual number of observations and the expected number of 
observations within an interval divided by the estimated standard deviation of the difference. The 
                                                 
3
 We eliminate the i subscript for simplicity. 
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expected number of observations in an interval is equal to the average of the two adjacent intervals. 
This standardised difference will approximate a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1. In order to test our hypotheses, we examine the intervals around the zero benchmark 
and test whether these intervals have a statistically significant positive (actual observations greater 
than what is expected) or negative (actual observations lower than expected) standardised 
difference. Specifically, we focus on the interval immediately to the right of zero, which we expect 
to have a higher number of observations than would be expected in a normal distribution; as well as 
the interval immediately to the left of zero, which we expect to have a lower number of 
observations than expected in a normal distribution.   
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings level sample (Panel A) and the 
earnings change sample (Panel B). Note that both earnings variables are scaled by beginning total 
assets in year t for the earnings level sample and in year t-1 for the earnings change sample. For the 
earnings level sample (Panel A), we find that the mean is negative for all the earnings level 
variables. On the contrary, the median for Et is 0.003 while medians for non-discretionary earnings 
estimated with the modified Jones model in year t (MJ_NDEt) and the non–discretionary earnings 
estimated with the performance-adjusted model in year t (PA_NDEt) are -0.036 and -0.024, 
respectively.
4
 The standard deviation of both non-discretionary earnings is higher than the standard 
deviation of Et. Thus it is clear that MJ_NDEt and PA_NDEt are scattered more widely than the Et 
in the sample period. The Min (Max) value for the Et is -0.538 (1.493) while for MJ_NDEt it is -
8.806 (16.670) and for PA_NDEt it is -8.116 (16.677).  
((INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)) 
                                                 
4
 The non-discretionary variables, MJ_NDEt and PA_NDE_t are residuals from regressions (1) and (2). To check for the 
normality of the residuals, we estimate the Shapiro-Wilk statistic for all regressions and find the assumption of 
normality holds. 
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Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the earnings change sample. The number of 
observations is lower than the earnings level sample due to the calculation requirements. Moreover, 
mean (0.002) and median (0.000) for the change in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-
1 (Et) are close, hence, it seems that distribution of change in earnings scaled by opening total 
assets is normal. With respect to non–discretionary earnings changes estimated with the modified 
Jones model (MJ_NDEt), both mean and median are positive, while, on the contrary, both are 
negative when non–discretionary earnings changes are estimated using the performance-adjusted 
model (PA_NDEt), possibly due to controlling for firm performance in the second methodology. 
In addition, it is evident that MJ_NDEt and PA_NDEt data are scattered more widely than Et 
considering the standard deviations (0.865 and 0.939 versus 0.136). Also, the Min (Max) values 
reveal similar differences between the earnings sample and earnings change sample, i.e.  Min (Max) 
for Et is -1.106 (1.681), for MJ_NDEt is -16.463 (16.716) and for PA_NDEt is -16.455 
(16.723).  
In summary, from the descriptive statistics it is obvious that the earnings level sample differs 
from the earnings change sample of Croatian companies in the period 2006-2013. More 
importantly, standard deviation of both earnings and earnings change samples reveal that non-
discretionary earnings and non-discretionary earnings change variables  are scattered more widely 
compared to earnings and earnings changes variables suggesting that earnings discretion aims to 
smooth earnings figures. Similar conclusions are made when one compares minimum and 
maximum values of both earnings variables  
The next sub-sections present and discuss the findings which emerged from the statistical 
analysis of the sample data during the 2006-2013 period. In addition, consistent with previous 
research, the evidence of earnings management around earnings benchmarks is presented as 
follows: firstly, earnings and non-discretionary earnings distributions are provided followed by the 
earnings changes and non-discretionary earnings changes distributions.  
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5.2 Earnings management to avoid losses 
Figure 1 presents the results of the first hypothesis test (managers manage earnings to avoid 
losses). More specifically, figure 1 presents the distribution of annual net income scaled by opening 
total asset in year t during the period 2006-2013. Note Figures 1-3 report earnings level variables on 
interval basis of a width of 0.005, in a range from -0.14 to 0.14. Also note that if the first hypothesis 
is true (i.e. earnings are managed to avoid losses) it predicts discontinuities in the distribution of 
scaled earnings around zero earnings.  
Figure 1 shows a bell-shaped distribution with a single peak. It is apparent from the histogram 
that there are irregularities around zero which is consistent with the predictions of the first 
hypothesis. Additionally, there are a relatively small number of observations at zero and less than 
zero whereas there are a large number of observations slightly greater than zero. Furthermore, 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) statistical test reveal the significance of these results. Specifically, 
the standardised difference for the first interval on the right-hand side of zero (between 0 and 0.005) 
is -6.383, indicating that there are significantly less observations than expected at the 1% level. The 
standardised difference for the interval to the right of that (between 0.005 and 0.010) is 9.774 
indicating a higher than expected number of observations, while the interval immediately to the left 
of zero (-0.005 to 0) is 0.249 which is not significantly different from what is expected under a 
normal distribution. These results provide evidence that earnings are shifted from losses or zero 
earnings to positive earnings. However, surprisingly, firms seem to shift not to the immediate right 
of zero but towards more positive earnings above 0.005, possibly to avoid being close to the zero 
earnings benchmark. 
((INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)) 
Figures 2 and 3 present the results of the third hypothesis test (non-discretionary earnings do 
not exhibit a discontinuity around zero). Figure 2 shows the distribution of annual non-discretionary 
earnings scaled by opening total assets, in time t, estimated with the modified Jones model during 
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the period 2006-2013 (MJ_NDEt). Note that if hypothesis 3 is true, it is expected that the removal 
of discretionary accruals from earnings will minimise discontinuities around zero if earnings are 
manipulated.  
Figure 2 results reveal that non-discretionary earnings are spread more widely than scaled 
earnings. Consistently with the third hypothesis predictions, discontinuities around zero disappear 
due to removal of discretionary accruals. Therefore, the distribution of MJ_NDEt is relatively 
smooth. Furthermore, the standardised difference in the intervals around zero does not show any 
significance.  For example, the standardised difference in the interval to the right of zero (0.000 to 
0.005) is -0.894 while that of the interval to the left of zero (-0.005 to 0.000) is 0.319. Interestingly, 
this histogram shows higher frequencies of negative earnings rather than frequencies of positive 
earnings. In addition, if one compares Figures 2 and 1, it is apparent the lower frequency of small 
positive earnings because these earnings figures may be free from managerial discretion.   
((INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE)) 
As already mentioned, Figure 3 also presents the results of the third hypothesis test using an 
alternative methodology. More specifically Figure 3 presents the distribution of annual non–
discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets, in year t, estimated with the performance-
adjusted model during the period 2006-2013 (PA_NDEt).  
((INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE)) 
Figure 3 results also reveal that PA_NDEt are spread more widely than scaled earnings. Not 
surprisingly, the distribution of PA_NDEt is consistent with the predictions of the third hypothesis, 
that the removal of discretionary accruals from scaled earnings will minimise discontinuities around 
zero, hence, it is relatively smooth. The standardised differences also do not show any significance. 
Specifically, the standardised difference for the interval to the right of zero (0.000 to 0.005) is 0.268 
and for the interval to the left of zero (-0.005 to 0.000) is 0.000. Moreover, Figure 3 similarly to 
Figure 2 reveals higher frequencies of negative earnings rather than positive earnings. More 
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importantly Figure 3 (similarly to Figure 2) when compared to figure 1 exposes the significant 
lower frequency of small positive earnings because these earnings figures may be free from 
managerial discretion.   
Overall, these results indicate that earnings management due to loss avoidance is prevalent in 
Croatian companies. Moreover, a comparison of the scaled earnings and two non-discretionary 
scaled earnings distributions reveals that managers in Croatia use their discretion for the 
enhancement of the reported earnings. The presented findings in this subsection are consistent with 
the existing research of earnings management to avoid losses.   
5.3 Earnings management to avoid declines in profit 
This subsection discusses the evidence of earnings management to avoid declines in earnings. 
Histograms are constructed to present the frequency distributions in the earnings change sample. 
These frequency distributions are presented in figures 4, 5 and 6.  Note that these figures present 
earnings change variables on interval basis of a width of 0.0025 in a range from -0.075 to 0.075.   
Figure 4 presents the results of the second hypothesis test (managers manage earnings to 
avoid earnings declines). More specifically figure 4 displays the distribution of the change in annual 
net income scaled by opening total assets, in year t-1, during the period 2007-2013 (Et).  If the 
second hypothesis is true, it predicts discontinuities in the distribution of the scaled earnings 
changes around zero earnings changes. In other words hypothesis 2 predicts high frequencies of 
small positive earnings changes and low frequencies of small negative earnings changes on the 
distribution of scaled changes in earnings (Et).  
Figure 4 presents a single peaked bell-shaped distribution. It is obvious that there are high 
frequencies of small positive earnings changes whereas the small negative earnings changes are less 
frequent. Such findings are consistent with the predictions of the second hypothesis. Furthermore, 
statistical significance has been confirmed by Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) statistical test. The 
standardised difference for the interval to the right of zero (0.000 to 0.0025) is 4.763, which 
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indicates a significantly higher than expected number of observations; whereas the standardised 
difference for the interval to the left of zero (-0.0025 to 0.000) is -5.504, indicating a significantly 
lower than expected number of observations. Additionally, the second interval to the right of zero 
(0.0025 to 0.005) has a standardised difference of 4.340. These results confirm that companies in 
Croatia do manage earnings to avoid decreases in earnings compared to prior year earnings. 
((INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE)) 
As explained earlier, it is expected that the removal of discretionary accruals from scaled 
change in earnings will minimise discontinuities around zero. This implies that non-discretionary 
changes in earnings are not expected to exhibit discontinuity around zero (hypothesis 4). Hence, the 
two distributions of non-discretionary change in earnings are presented in Figures 5 and 6 in order 
to test hypothesis 4. 
More specifically, Figure 5 presents the distribution of non–discretionary earnings changes 
scaled by opening lagged total assets estimated with the Modified Jones model, in year t-1, for the 
period 2007-2013 (MJ_NDEt).  
((INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE)) 
Figure 5 presents clear evidence that non-discretionary scaled changes in earnings are spread 
differently from scaled changes in earnings. In addition, the distribution is not bell shaped nor 
single peaked as is the distribution of scaled change in earnings (see Figure 4). The standardised 
differences in the intervals around zero reveal similar results. Specifically, the standardised 
difference for the interval to the right of zero (0.000 to 0.0025) is 0.311 and that of the interval to 
the left of zero (-0.0025 to 0.000) is -0.207, which are not statistically significant.  These findings 
are consistent with the predictions of the fourth hypothesis which suggest that discontinuities 
around zero earnings changes disappear due to the removal of discretionary accruals. Not 
surprisingly, this histogram shows mixed frequencies of non-discretionary changes in earnings.  
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Figure 6 shows the distribution of annual non–discretionary changes in earnings scaled by 
opening lagged total assets estimated with the performance-adjusted model, in year t-1, during the 
period 2007-2013 (PA_NDEt).  
Figure 6 similar to figure 5 suggests that the distribution of PA_NDEt is different than that 
of Et (see Figure 4). Furthermore, this multimodal distribution of PA_NDEt is in line with the 
expectation of hypothesis 4 that the removal of the discretionary accruals from scaled change in 
earnings will reduce the frequency of small positive earnings changes in the distribution. In 
addition, Figure 6 similar to Figure 5 demonstrates mixed frequencies of non-discretionary changes 
in earnings. Standardised differences as in the prior graph (Figure 5) do not reveal significant 
differences from normal distribution around zero. The standardised difference of the interval to the 
right of zero (0.000 to 0.0025) is -0.052 and that of the interval to the left of zero (-0.0025 to 0.000) 
is -0.026. 
To sum up, the results from this subsection illustrate that earnings management to avoid 
declines in profit is prevalent in Croatian companies. When the frequency distribution of changes in 
annual net income scaled by opening lagged total assets is compared to two non-discretionary 
scaled changes in earnings distributions it is evident that Croatian managers use their discretion to 
beat the benchmark of previous year’s earnings. Therefore, findings in this section are consistent 
with the existing research on earnings management in order to avoid earnings declines from prior 
year earnings.  
((INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, the main objective is to assess whether companies in Croatia manage reported 
earnings. Following this, we provide evidence of the frequency of earnings management around two 
benchmarks, namely zero earnings and maintaining current earnings in relation to last year’s 
earnings. The analysis is performed on 186 companies with data over the period 2006-2013 using 
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Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) distributional approach. Furthermore, we expect that removing 
discretionary accruals would reduce irregularities within cross sectional frequency distributions. 
The most obvious finding to emerge from this study is that managers in Croatian companies 
manipulate earnings to avoid losses as well as to sustain previous earnings levels. In addition, the 
statistical tests confirm the significance of the overall results. Furthermore, upon removal of 
discretionary accruals from reported earnings, these discontinuities are reduced, providing evidence 
of accrual manipulation in Croatia. Taken together, these results suggest a prevalence of earnings 
management in Croatia using discretionary accruals. 
The findings in this paper are subject of a number of important limitations that need to be 
considered. As stated in existing literature, this approach does not consider the background in which 
earnings management has been achieved (Holland and Ramsay, 2003). In addition, the period that 
was analysed includes a prolonged financial crisis. Secondly, due to the small sample of companies, 
the regression analysis for the calculation of non-discretionary accruals was performed by years 
rather than industries. Moreover, the distributional approach does not consider incentives for 
earnings management to reach benchmarks (Holland and Ramsay, 2003).  
This study has identified some questions in need of further investigation. It would be 
interesting to assess the steps that companies use for earnings enhancements to reach benchmarks. 
Future research might investigate the extent and the scope of earnings management in Croatia in 
different industries. Another possible area of future research would be to investigate why companies 
manage earnings to beat benchmarks. Hence, further research needs to examine more closely the 
links between earnings management and incentives.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A 
        Descriptive statistics for the earnings level sample 
        
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 50% 75% Min Max 
Et 1327 -0.006 0.104 -0.035 0.003 0.029 -0.538 1.493 
 
        MJ_NDEt 1160 -0.056 0.601 -0.142 -0.036 0.036 -8.806 16.670 
         PA_NDEt 1160 -0.015 0.701 -0.122 -0.024 0.055 -8.116 16.677 
Panel B 
        Descriptive statistics for the earnings change sample 
         
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 25% 50% 75% Min Max 
Et 1198 0.002 0.136 -0.020 0.000 0.016 -1.106 1.681 
         MJ_NDEt 974 0.039 0.865 -0.108 0.012 0.167 -16.463 16.716 
         
PA_NDEt 974 -0.012 0.939 -0.159 -0.009 0.117 -16.455 16.723 
Et = Earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t;   
MJ_NDEt = Non–discretionary earnings, scaled by opening total assets in year t, measured as earnings in year t less 
discretionary accruals in year t, estimated with the modified Jones model in year t; 
PA_NDEt = Non–discretionary earnings, scaled by opening total assets in year t,  measured as earnings in year t less 
discretionary accruals in year t, estimated with the performance-adjusted model in year t ; 
Et = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t – 1; 
MJ_NDEt = Non–discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total assets, in year t-1, measured as change in 
earnings less discretionary accruals, estimated with the modified Jones model in year t – 1; 
PA_NDEt = Non–discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total assets, in year t-1, measured as change in 
earnings less discretionary accruals, estimated with the performance-adjusted model in year t – 1. 
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Figure 1: The distribution of annual net income scaled by opening total assets in year t for the 
period 2006-2013 (Et) 
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.005 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the dashed 
line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.005. The vertical axis labelled 
frequency represents the number of observations in each scaled earnings interval. The outliers of the annual earnings 
scaled by opening total assets in year t are not presented in the graph. 
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Figure 2: The distribution of annual non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
in year t estimated with the Modified Jones model for the period 2006-2013 (MJ_NDEt) 
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.005 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the dashed 
line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.005. The vertical axis labelled 
frequency represents the number of observations in each non–discretionary scaled earnings interval. The outliers of the 
annual non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t are not presented in the graph.  
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Figure 3: The distribution of annual non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
in year t estimated with the performance-adjusted model for the period 2006-2013 (PA_NDEt) 
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.005 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the dashed 
line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.05. The vertical axis labelled 
frequency represents the number of observations in each non–discretionary scaled earnings interval. The outliers of the 
annual non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t are not presented in the graph.  
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Figure 4: The distribution of change in annual net income scaled by opening total assets in 
year t-1 for the period 2007-2013 (Et) 
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.0025 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the 
dashed line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.0025. The vertical axis 
labelled frequency represents the number of observations in each scaled earnings change interval. The outliers of 
changes in earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1 are not presented in this graph. 
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Figure 5: The distribution of non-discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total 
assets in year t-1 estimated with the Modified Jones model for the period 2007-2013 
(MJ_NDEt)  
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.0025 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the 
dashed line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.0025. The vertical axis 
labelled frequency represents the number of observations in each non-discretionary scaled earnings change interval. The 
outliers of changes in non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1 are not presented in this 
graph. 
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Figure 6: The distribution of non-discretionary change in earnings scaled by opening total 
assets in year t-1 estimated with the performance-adjusted model for the period 2007-2013 
(PA_NDEt) 
 
Notes: The distribution interval widths are 0.0025 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the 
dashed line. The first interval to the right of zero contains all the observations that are >0 ≤0.0025. The vertical axis 
labelled frequency represents the number of observations in each non-discretionary scaled earnings change interval. The 
outliers of changes in non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets in year t-1 are not presented in this 
graph. 
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